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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH UTILITY SHAREHOLDERS ASSOCIATION, ALEX OBLAD and HAROLD BURTON;
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES; UTAH COALITION OF SENIOR
CITIZENS,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.
PUBLIC SERVICE .COMMISSION OF UTAH;
MILLY O. BERNARD, Chairman, DAVID
IRVINE, Commissioner, and BRENT
CAMERON, Commissioner,

Case Nos. 18286, 18303, 18304

Respondents,
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, a
Utah corporation; WEXPRO COMPANY,
a Utah corporation; UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION
OF PUBLIC UTILITIES; and UTAH COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES,
Defendants/IntervenorResponden ts.
ANSWERING BRIEF OF
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY
AND
WEXPRO COMPANY

NATURE OF THE CASE
This Case arises out of proceedings before the Public Service
Commission of Utah, in part on remand from an Opinion of this Court

1/
of May 10, 1979,- in which a Stipulation and Agreement of the

Y

In Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Service Commission, 595 P.2d
871 (Utah 1979), generically referred to as the "Wexpro Case", this Court
reversed and remanded the matter to the Utah Commission for further proceedings in accordance with the holding of the Opinion. In the course of
those proceedings, the Commission .addressed the larger issues of the
Mountain Fuel exploration and development program, and after a hearing on
a Motion for approval of a settlement Agreement, a remedy was fashioned
and Order entered by the Commission that ran to the entire MFS exploration
and development operations.
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adversary parties in the earlier case with regard to the manner,
·method and accounting of the operation and development of Mountain
Fuel's oil, gas and wildcat properties were comprehensively reviewed
and then approved by the Commission in its Order of December 31,
1981.

For the convenience of the Court, there is filed as a separ-

ate Attachment to this Brief true copies of the Stipulation and
the Agreement together with a copy of the December 31, 1981 Order
of the Commission approving the settlement.
PARTIES BEFORE THE UTAH COMMISSION
The public parties before the Commission (Utah PSC or Commission)
in the proceedings below were the Utah Division of Public Utilities
(Division) and the Utah Committee of Consumer Services (Committee)
2/
represented by the Attorney General and his Assistants.- Mountain
Fuel Supply Company (MFS) and Wexpro Company (Wexpro) were investor
owned private companies whose properties and interests were directly
affected.

The Utility Shareholders Association (Shareholders)

appeared as an intervenor as did the Utah Coalition of Senior
Citizens (Coalition) and each fully participated in the Commission
proceedings below.

The Utah Department of Administrative Services

(Administrative Services) , while not participating in the principal
proceedings before the Commission, filed a petition for rehearing
to the Commission Order of December 31, 1981.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY THE COMMISSION
The Commission initially set the case down for hearing on
remand, as to whether a transfer to Wexpro of the historically

y

The Division of Public Utilities and Committee of Consumer Services were
the appellants in the initial appeal before thi.s. rn_ Jrt1

c
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classified non-utility oil properties by MFS was in the public
interest and otherwise consistent with the holding of this court.
The scope of the hearing was later expanded to include numerous
additional issues relating to the entire exploration program.
After several continuances granted because of pending negotiations,
the Division, Committee, Mountain Fuel and Wexpro submitted a proposed Stipulation and Agreement of settlement of all issues to the
Commission for its review and approval.

Because the Stipulation

and Agreement were between the parties to the initial controversy
and included the public agencies acting in behalf of the ratepayers,
the Commission ordered a hearing and review of all aspects of the
Stipulation and Agreement as to whether they were, in fact, consistent with

re~ulatory

policy and in the public interest and whether

such were in conformance with the holding of this Court.

After

eight days of testimony, substantial argument and written briefs,
the matter was submitted to the Commission after which it issued
its Order and Report, including Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, on December 31, 1981.
From that Order, the Shareholders, the Coalition, and the
Administrative Services filed separate petitions for rehearing
which were denied by the Commission on February 9, 1982.

Indivi-

dual petitions for certiorari were thereafter filed with this Court
by each of said interests seeking review of the December 31, 1981
Order.

The certiorari appeals were consolidated for briefing,

argument and disposition.
ISSUES ON CERTIORARI APPEALS
The questions presented for review by this Court by the appeals
of the Shareholders, Administrative Services, and the Coalition are:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1.

Did the Commission have jurisdiction to accept
the Stipulation and Agreement of the parties and
determine that such Stipulation and Agreement
should be accepted?

2.

Are the Findings and Conclusions that the Stipulation
and Agreement settling the Wexpro case were in the
public interest supported by competent evidence?

3.

Did the Commission err in law in accepting and adopting the Stipulation and Agreement which settled the
Wexpro litigation?

4.

Does the Commission Report and Order sufficiently
define and approve the settlement, including the
transfers of property to Wexpro and Celsius, as
to be afforded the finality of res judicata?

5.

Did the Commission err in not ordering an appraisal to determine the value in dollars of all the
properties involved in the settlement?
SUMMARY OF MFS AND WEXPRO POSITION

The Report and Order of the Commission in this Case should be
affirmed.

This Court, in Committee of Consumer Services, supra

remanded the case to the Commission with directions to conduct
further proceedings (595 P.2d at 871).

The Commission did just

that.
Extensive hearings were held and the Stipulation and the
Agreement of the parties were submitted only after intense, lengthy and extremely difficult negotiations.

The overwhelming and

-A- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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competent evidence supports the Findings of the Commission that
the Stipulation and Agreement were in the public interest, in
the interest of the ratepayer and implement the regulatory policy
of this State.

Such Findings, being supported by competent, un-

controverted evidence, are thus, by statute, not open to cha!lenge or review before this Court.

The Commission Order obser-

ved and the Stipulation and Agreement incorporated the principles
set forth by this Court in the initial Nexpro decision.
The method of valuation of the properties transferred was
also correctly determined, was consistent with industry standards, resulted in a transfer for fair market consideration and
was in the public interest.
The Report and Order of the Commission deal with the transfer
3/
of properties to Wexpro and Celsius- and with the allocation of
benefits from the producing properties with finality with the
doctrine of res judicata applicable to property transfers and
other provisions of the Report and Order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The presentations of the facts in the record made in the opening Briefs of Appellants are incomplete.

Administrative Services

essentially ignores the record in this proceeding and, instead,
devotes 65 pages in an emotional and erroneous translation of the
original record in the first Wexpro case, as though that matter

Celsius Energy Company (Celsius) a wholly controlled affiliate of MFS
was established for the purpose of holding the exploration acreage and
of conducting the oil and gas exploration activities, all as contemplated by the Stipulation and Agreement of settlement.
(Tr. 961,
1409-10; Stipulation§ 17.4)
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was again before the Court.

The record and issues in the

original Wexpro case are completely different from the record

4/
and issues in the instant appeal.- This Case and its record
relate to the approval of the Stipulation and Agreement of
settlement and in no sense constitute a rehearing of Wexpro.
Accordingly, the Statement of Administrative Services is of
very little assistance.
On the other hand, the factual statement of the Shareholders
is accurate but incomplete to an analysis of all of the issues on
appeal.

Therefore, MFS and Wexpro set forth their statement of

Facts in accordance with Rule 75(p) (2) U.R.C.P.
1.

Mountain Fuel Exploration and Development Program.

John

Crawford, Jr., Executive Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer
of MFS, testified that the Company was organized in 1935 through
the consolidation of several companies, including an oil company,
and maintained from its inception an exploration and development
program including ownership of and rights to certain oil properties.
The oil operations of Mountain Fuel were, from the beginning of

!/

In Wexpro the PSC ordered that it did not have jurisdiction over or to
approve or disapprove the transfer of certain oil properties historically
(pursuant to prior Commission orders) classified in a non-utility oil
account of MFS. It also approved an Amended Agreement of Purchase and
Sale and an Amended Joint Exploration Agreement (J.E.A.) between MFS and
Wexpro. This Court reversed the PSC Order and indicated that with regard
to Commission jurisdiction, the elements of classification of the oil
properties as non-utility should be re-examined (albeit retroactively).
The settlement bears no relationship to the Amended Agreement of Purchase
and Sale and the program provided for therein bears no similarity to the
J.E.A. The appeal now before the Court does not involve any such jurisdictional or classification issue, because the Stipulation and Agreement
of settlement assum~ that the PSC has jurisdiction over all oil and gas
properties, whether previously classified as non-utility or utility.

-6-
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the Commission regulation in 1940, excluded from utility regula-

5/

tion.- Beginning in 1947, the Commission utilized, a method of
accounting for the classification of gas properties as utility
assets and oil properties as non-utility assets and over the
years, approved, if not mandated, such classification system
for MFS.

(Tr. 1374-86)

Repeated attempts were made over the

years of regulation to have the Commission order MFS to include
oil revenues in its utility accounts to reduce gas rates, but
such attempts were specifically denied.

(Tr. 1378-1383)

For

example, the exact method used in classifying oil wells and gas
wells, which this Court disapproved in 1979, was expressly adopted
6/
by the Commission in a 1959 Order.
(Tr. 1380)As the exploration and development program of MFS was carried
out over the years, both the utility and non-utility accounts made
contributions to its functions.

(Tr. 1376-1379)

Even though all

of the capital costs of leasehold acquisition of oil and gas
exploration acreage, all of the capital costs of oil exploration
and drilling, and a proportionate share of unsuccessful dry hole
expenses were paid from the MFS non-utility accounts (Tr. 1376-81),
the inclusion of a portion of unsuccessful drilling costs as an
expen$e in setting gas rates and the existence of the non-utility
oil properties continued to cause contention.

(Tr. 1377)

In

1974, the Commission proposed to use oil revenues to reduce gas

~

In 1940, the Commission issued an order eliminating oil wells from utility
rate base accounts as not being used and useful in the sale of natural gas.
(Tr. 1374)

§./

PSC Case No. 4797.
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rates (Tr. 1382), but backed-off in the face of the suspension
of trading and a disastrous market decline in the value of MFS'
stock on the New York Stock Exchange.

(Tr. 1382-3)

In the Spring of 1976, MFS faced a proxy battle to remove
present management because of the continuing problem with the
separated, unregulated oil properties.

(Tr. 1388-9)

In late

1976 MFS created Wexpro, a wholly-owned subsidiary, and transferred to it the oil properties, then held in a long established
non-utility account.

Wexpro was also to have conducted a joint

drilling program with Mountain Fuel under the J.E.A.

The Com-

mission, after requiring some amendments and concluding that
it did not possess jurisdiction over the transfer of the nonutility oil properties from MFS to Wexpro, approved on April 11,
1978 the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the J.E.A. between MFS
and Wexpro.

The Division and the Committee, by certiorari,

appealed that Order to this Court.
2.

Holding of Supreme Court on Appeal.

This Court, under

Opinion dated May 10, 1979, reversed the Report and Order of the
Commission and decided that until there was an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the transferred oil properties were, in
fact, non-utility assets, there was not an adequate basis to
determine whether the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction
reached the transfer.

The Court also reversed the Order of the

7/

PSC approving the Amended Agreement of Purchase and Sale.-

The majority Opinion authored by Maughan, C. J., went on
to observe that the traditional concepts of public utility law,

2/

See 595 P.2d at 873, 877 ..

_o_
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viz., that the investor supplies risk capital and sustains the
loss of a speculative· venture, may have been modified over the
years in the MFS exploration program through an exploration
expense for unsuccessful well drilling being reflected in utility
rates.

The Maughan Opinion stated that such charges were, in

effect, a capital contribution bi customers to a speculative
venture.
The majority Opinion also observed that exploration or
development properties should be transferred by Mountain Fuel
only for fair mark~t consideration so that an "appropriate" benefit
could be realized by customers and then only after the Comission
has determined whether the transaction is detrimental to the

8/
ratepayer and in the public interest.The majority Opinion also commented on the question of
whether the arrangement between Wexpro and Mountain Fuel, regarding the sale of natural gas at market price on developed
acreage other than that transferred under the Agreement, violated the "no-profits-to-affiliates" rule.

The Opinion suggested

that such a sale would so do.
The decision also declared that Wexpro had the option of
withdrawing from the Joint Exploration Agreement.
3.

Case on Remand Before Commission.

v

Soon after the issu-

ance of the majority Opinion, Wexpro availed itself of the option
and terminated the Joint Exploration Agreement (Tr. 1479, Stipulation §§ 1.14, 1.16), thus making moot the question of whether the

~

See 595 P.2d at 878.

2/

See 595 P.2d at 879.

-9-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1976 transfer and proposed exploration program were detrimental
to the MFS customer, in the public interest, or for market value.
The Case, upon remand to the Commission, was set down to
determine whether any exploration and development properties of
Mountain Fuel and particularly the classified non-utility oil
properties, should be transferred to Wexpro as consonant with
the public interest, whether such would be detrimental to the
customers of MFS, and if a transfer were proposed, what conditions
should be attached to benefit the customers and to satisfy the
public interest.
The parties before the Commission on remand were those
before the Supreme Court in the original Wexpro appeal, namely,
the Division, the Committee, MFS, Wexpro and the individual
shareholders Oblad and Burton.

In addition, the CoalLtion and

the Shareholders Association sought and were granted permission
to intervene.

The preliminary motions and pre-trial proceedings

before the Commission were vigorously contested between the
parties, with MFS and Wexpro raising a number of Federal and
State constitutional questions.

In addition, litigation had

been initiated by MFS and Wexpro against the Division, the Committee, and the Commission before the United States Court for
Utah raising constitutional questions sterning from the May 10,
10/
1979 Opinion of this Court,~ and reorganization proceedings

10/

Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Public Service Conunission of Utah, et al.,
U.S. District Court No. C-80-0710J. While said complaint was dismissed
as premature in July of 1981, the dismissal was without prejudice to
refile upon completion of the pending proceedings before the Conunission.
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had been initiated by MFS before the Federal Energy Regulatory
11/
Commission in Washington, D.C.~
4.

Stipulation and Settlement of Case.

During the pendency

of the Case before the Commission on remand, numerous problems
and practical considerations required MFS to make certain business decisions and to advise the Conunission that the sweep of
the majority Opinion of the Supreme Court in Wexpro had made
it virtually impossible for the Company to conduct a utility
exploration and development program or. to raise new investment
capital for that purpose.

MFS was experiencing great difficulty

raising investment capital and retaining its exploration personnel.

Shareholders of MFS were unwilling to invest further

monies until it was determined the manner in which risk capital for exploration and development would be treated and accounted for by MFS and Wexpro.

(Tr. 1137-43, 1475-79)

The expert witnesses testified that:

the drillng program

in the future was going to require investment of about $200 million (Tr. 1056); the required funds could not be generated internally (Tr. 1529); the shareholders would not support a joint program with customers and it would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to raise outside capital; the exploration program was
at a standstill (Tr. 1039-40).; leases were expiring (Tr. 1479); the
Company was experiencing great difficulty retaining skilled explor-

11/

FERC Docket Nos. CPB0-274, CPB0-275 and CI80-233.
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ation personnel; the proceedings and litigation were diverting
inordinate amounts of time of corporate management of MFS (Tr.
1480); the Company had every reason, under the circumstances,
to "hold back" on the exploration program (Tr. 1040).
The exploration program was, thus, on "hold" by 1980 because
of the unresolved litigation (Tr. 1039-1040); there was concern
on the part of all parties that leases on wildcat acreage were
expiring, commitments to drill should be made as part of an
on-going exploration program and that unless the Commission
proceedings (which had been pending since late 1976) were resolved quickly and the pending litigation finally terminated,
the exploration and development program of MFS would be irreparably damaged, regardless of who prevailed, to the injury of
ratepayers, stockholders, and the Company.

(Tr. 943, 944-45,

152 0-21, 152 9}
For the better part of six months in the Spring and Summer
1981, intensive negotiations were conducted between legal counsel
for the Division and Committee on the one hand, and Mountain Fuel
and Wexpro, on the other hand.

Expert economic and petroleum

industry consultants also attended and participated.

The nego-

tiations were "very tough, and hard nosed", conducted at "armslength", with impasse being reached at several points.
900, 1015)

(Tr. 8 99-

As one legal counsel put it to the Commission, the

negotiations were the most complex, involved, and difficult in
a long career of legal practice.

(Tr. 891-92)

Counsel for the

Coalition was invited to attend any negotiating sessions and
although such invitation was declined, the Coalition was apprised
of general developments taking place.

(Tr. 952-53)

During the
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negotiations, one of the principal concerns was that any stipulation or settlement reached be generally consistent with the observations and holdings of this Court in the Wexpro Opinion.
In late August 1981, a settlement, subject to final drafting, was reached among the Division, Committee, Mountain Fuel,
and Wexpro with regard to the allocation of benefits from the
producing reservoirs, the conduct and operation of exploration
and development, the transfer of properties, the credits to
utility accounts for the benefit of customers, the preservation
of cost-of-service gas, the recognition of capital investment,
and other relevant factors.

The settlement took the form of a

Stipulation between counsel for the principal parties and an
Agreement between the parties which were laid before the Commission under a Joint Petition for approval.
The Commission thereupon held hearings in October and November 1981 on the questions of whether the Stipulation and Agreement were

detrimenta~

to ratepayers, whether they were in the pub-

lic interest, and whether such should be approved or rejected as
consistent with the regulatory policy of the Commission and the
prior Opinion of this Court.
5.

Terms of Stipulation and Settlement Agreement.

The

Stipulation and Agreement are comprehensive regarding the exploration and development of Mountain Fuel properties held in both the
utility and nori-utility accounts.

They are complex, lenghy and

detailed.
A summary of the Stipulation and Agreement has been set out
both in the Answering Brief of the Division and the Committee (pages
12-18) and the opening Brief of the Shareholders (pages 9-15) hereSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in.

Apart from editorial comments in the Division and Committee

Brief, the factual summaries in both Briefs are accurate,
are adopted by MFS and Wexpro for purposes of this Brief,
and the Court is referred to such summaries.
6.

Commission Proceedings on Stipulation and Agreement of

Settlement.

For eight days, the Commission took testimony

from expert economists, accountants, petroleum engineers, energy
and utility rate consultants, petroleum geologists, security
analysts, shareholders, officers of MFS and Wexpro, an Assistant Attorney General, and public witnesses regarding the factual
and legal policy surrounding the Stipulation and Agreement.

The

following is a capsule summary of the evidence:
Herman G. Roseman.

Engaged by the Division, Roseman is an

economist and regulatory consultant of national standing with
substantial experience as an employee of the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) in the regulation of utility and oil and gas
companies.

(Tr. 1009-13)

Roseman was retained by the Division

as an expert witness to testify

~n

what was expected to be a

sharply contested trial, but when settlement talks developed,
he assisted the Division in negotiations.
As to a fully litigated contest between MFS on one side and
the Division and Committee on the other, Roseman was not sure
which would be worse for the consumer -- a win by MFS or a win
by the customers.
(Tr. 1017)

Both "appeared to be disastrous outcomes".

'
A customer win causing a complete roll-in of
the

previously designated non-utility oil properties into the utility
gas accounts for rate making would severely curtail and perhaps
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even eliminate the MFS exploration program.

(Tr. 1017)

Roseman

further testified that if a roll-in were to occur, all MFS would
receive from future exploration would be the possibility of earning a utility rate of return for cost-of-service gas, as reduced
by oil revenues.

Such would not attract new capital and investors

who needed the prospects of unregulated returns to invest in high
risk oil and gas exploration.

(Tr. 1031-33)

Roseman further

believed that a roll-in would have a major a·na adverse financial
impact on MFS, making it extremely difficult for the Company to
raise either common equity or debt capital on reasonable terms.
(Tr. 1040-4)
Roseman was also of the judgment that a complete roll-in of
the oil properties and revenues would have a very negative impact
upon MFS personnel and would probably result in a much less aggressive program.

In response to a Commission inquiry, Roseman stated

that a higher regulated rate of return on the rolled-in properties
would not solve the fundamental economic realities.

(Tr. 1042)

Roseman strongly supported the settlement Agreement before
the Commission, testifying that it provided incentives for the
development of oil and gas acreage while protecting the interests
of the customers of MFS in cost-of-service gas and future reserves.
(Tr. 1023, 1029-30)

Beyond that, Roseman testified that while the

customers had a claim on a substantial fraction of the oil profits,
he was "never persuaded that the share was 100%." The 54% share
arrived at in the settlement Agreement was slightly better than
he had hoped to achieve as a minimum in the litigation, particularly in light of other aspects of the Agreement.

-15-

(Tr. 1024)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Roseman was of the view that oil and gas exploration and
development has not proved successful as a regulated public
utility function.

(Tr. 1022)

Apart from the many other problems,

it was difficult for a regulatory commission to cover the Company
in the "down side risk" of successive dry holes.

(Tr. 1033, 1042)

The formation of joint ventures to share the risk of deep and difficult drilling is common in the Rocky Mountain area, but Roseman
testified that exploration companies do, in fact, shy away from
being a "joint venturer with a regulated utility", because the
venture may subject the operator to regulation.

(Tr. 1032, 1034)

Roseman testified that under the settlement, the utility
receives the benefit of customers substantial overriding royalty
interest of 7% on undeveloped wildcat acreage which he characterized
as "a fairly high figure as overriding royalties in the oil business
go".

(Tr. 1026)

Also all contributions from customers are elimin-

ated, both with regard to carrying charges on undeveloped acreage
or dry hole costs.

In short, the customer bears no risk in wildcat

drilling or otherwise under the Agreement.

(Tr. 1024, 1028)

As to the no-profit-to-affiliate rule, Roseman stated that in
his experience with the Federal Power Commission in the regulation
of natural gas public utilities, the theory has not been applied
so as to eliminate all profit between affiliated companies, but
only excessive profits that may come through either self dealing
or a monopoly position brought about by regulation.

(Tr. 1038)

Reasonable profit between affiliated companies should be allowed.
(Tr. 1038)

Even in the case of cost-of-service gas from the pro-

duction of MFS, itself, the Commission has always recognized the

, r
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element of profit for return on capital.

(Tr. 1039)

Roseman knew

of no instance in which cost-of-service gas prices do not include
a reasonable return on capital.
Roseman emphasized that the entire settlement and all of its
various constituent parts were:

"interrelated."

(Tr. 1015, 1045)

The settlement must be viewed in its entirety (Tr. 1021) in order
to properly assess the consideration which flowed to the benefit
of customers.

·(Tr. 1023-25)

The individual aspects of the nego-

tiations and settlement should not be isolated when examining the
totality of the bargain.

The consideration and benefits received

by the customers for the settlement are for fair market value and
in the public interest.

(Tr. 1029-30)

Roseman pointed out that if the settlement had not been
reached, there was a great risk that customers would lose the
benefit of cost-of-service gas as a result of federal regulation.
He characterized this possibility as "the greatest single risk"
of litigating the case in an adversarial atmosphere.

(Tr. 1018)

The settlement removes this risk from the customer and assures
continued availability of cost-of-service gas.
Richard Walker.

Mr. Walker, a CPA with 35 years experience

and senior partner of Arthur Andersen & Co. in Chicago, specializes
in utility regulation.

He has performed work for a substantial

number of natural gas and oil companies, including natural gas
transportation and distribution utilities.

Walker was retained

by MFS to review the terms of the Stipulation and Agreement.
Mr. Walker testified that one of the oldest problems in
utility regulation is keeping the role of the investor and the

-17-
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customer clear.

(Tr. 1193)

The investor supplies the risk

capital and needs to know what that risk will be and what he
can expect as a reward.

The operating expenses of a utility

company are recovered in the price of the services and products
sold to the customer.

Investment capital is provided by share-

holders and bondholders.

The customer should not become an
(Tr. 1194)

involuntary supplier of capital.

Walker testified

that, by and large, unsuccessful exploration and development
expenses, including nonproductive dry hole operations, are viewed
in this country as an item of current operating expense in fixing
utility gas rates.

However, the Supreme Court of Utah, in the

Wexpro decision, seemed to say that such _current operating
expenses were, in reality, capital contributions.

With that

finding, the roles of the investor and the customer were reversed
and confused.

(Tr. 1207)

Whether the conunent of the Utah Court

to this effect was either central or gratuitous to its opinion
in Wexpro, Mr. Walker stated that under the Agreement of settlement, the roles of the investor and the customer are clearly
separated with exploration and development costs, including the
risk of dry holes, placed with the investor.
desirable".

This is "very

{Tr. 1195)

Turning to the no-profit-to-affiliate rule, Walker stated
that American utility law, as he understands it, permits a fair
profit in affiliated transactions.

-18-

{Tr. 1199-1200)

Mr. Walker
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had reviewed the actual records in two cases cited by the Utah
Court in its Wexpro decision on the no-profit-to-affiliate rule.
He testified that in both cases, the affiliate was permitted, by
the final court decision, to earn a reasonable return on capital
invested.

(Tr. 1199-1200)

As to the provisions in the settlement Agreement relating to
sales of natural gas between MFS-Wexpro and MFS-Celsius, the noprofit-to-affiliate principal has no application in any event,
because the bargaining parties were not MFS and Wexpro or Celsius,
but wer~ MFS and Wexpro on one side of the table and the Division
and the Committee on the other side. (Tr. 1201)
Walker testified that oil and gas exploration is not well
suited to utility regulation because of the high risks and great
uncertainty in the value of discoveries in relation to expenditures.
(Tr. 1202-3)

Walker was opposed to conscripting or labeling as

investment capital the payments made by customers in purchasing
natural gas.

(Tr. 1204)

Of the many pipeline and distribution

utilities having exploration programs which Mr. Walker represents,
none of them have exploration and development on-going in a

regula~

ted entity other than those properties which are just living out
their lives.

(Tr. 1205)

Further, exploration companies in the

field are not anxious to conduct joint explorations or operations
with regulated utilities.

(Tr. 1205)

Mr. Walker stated that a joint program between investor and
utility customer would not work since the investor would be an
unwilling partner and could receive a substantially different return
than the customer, the latter of whom may take his return off the
top in a regulated operation.

(Tr. 1213-4)
-19-
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John F. O'Leary.

Mr. O'Leary, called by the Shareholders,

was formerly Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy,
Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration, Chief Energy
Officer of the State of New Mexico, Director of Licensing of the
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Director of the U.S. Bureau of
Minerals, Chief of the Bureau of Natural Gas of the Federal Power
Commission, and Deputy Asst. Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Interior responsible for energy matters.

(Tr. 1216)

O'Leary testified that in his experience, natural gas exploration in the various states is generally carried out as a non-utility ·
function with the gas being transferred to the utility at market
price.

(Tr. 1218)

Federal regulation, as well, of exploration by

regulated pipeline companies was changed to a non-utility activity
in 1969.

(Tr. 1218-23)

O'Leary stated that an involuntary dril-

ling program forced on the Company would not be successful and
would cause good personnel to leave MFS employment.

(Tr. 1226-8)

A joint program between the customer and the shareholder will not
work.

(Tr. 1230)
Contrary to the assumption that Administrative Services and

the Shareholders make in their Brief, pricing gas at cost-ofservice does not assure a price below market.

High risk and un-

successful drilling over a period of time, even though exploration
was aggressively pursued, would place gas customers in a position
where they paid more tor internally generated production than would
be paid in the open market.

A regulatory commission, in his experi-

ence, would be very hard pressed to permit an unsuccessful utility
exploration program to continue for any length of time.

(Tr. 1230-1)
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O'Leary studied the settlement Agreement and found that it
places dry hole risks entirely on the investor, that the utility
gas customer was served very well, and that if anything, the Agreement does not make a fair distribution from the exploration program
to MFS shareholders.

(Tr. 1226, 1232-3)

As to the no-profit-to-affiliate rule, O'Leary testified
that in all of his regulatory experience, he understood it to
foreclose only abusive profits and not profits which would be
normally earned in a competitive market.

(Tr. 1233-4)

On cross-

examination, he stated emphatically that a call on the gas in
behalf of MFS from wildcat acreage at market price did not violate the no-profit-to-affiliate rule.

(Tr. 1238-40)

Mr. O'Leary stated that in all events, it was extremely
important that the settlement Agreement and Stipulation, if
accepted by the Commission, be final and binding in the future
and as to future parties, so that property transferred, capital
committed, benefits received, and properties developed in reliance
upon the Agreement and the Commission Order could not be undone
or retroactively unraveled to their detriment four to five years
in the future.
Howard Ritzma.

Ritzma, called by the Division and Committee,

is a petroleum geologist with vast experience with oil and gas
activities in the Rocky Mountains.

He is the Assistant Director

and Chief of the Petroleum Section of the Utah Geological and
Mineral Survey.

Ritzma testified that with regard to aggressive
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exploration companies, they have not wanted to explore jointly with
MFS because of the utility regulation of the Company.

(Tr. 1267-8)

Further, Ritzma said that in high risk wildcat exploration, it
would be very difficult for MFS to obtain either exploration
partners or investors without the prospect of "the big strike"
which utility regulation cannot provide.

(Tr. 1270)

As to the settlement Agreement, Ritzma had been consulted
by the Division and Committee in the settlement negotiations as
a State of Utah employee.

Ritzma had written a letter to the

Commission recommending approval of the settlement Agreement as
both a State employee and as an expert consultant.

The Utah

Director of Natural Resources had also approved the letter.

(Tr.

1272)
In the view of Ritzma, the settlement Agreement offers
better advantages to the utility customer of MFS than the prior
Joint Exploration Agreement between MFS and Wexpro.
James A. Harmon.

(Tr. 1273)

Mr. Harmon, an investment· banker and general

partner of Wertheim and Co. of New York City who works with large
instutitional investors trading significant blocks of MFS stock,
is a member of the MFS Board of Directors.

(Tr. 1105-10)

Harmon

has assisted MFS in much of its capital financing and has talked
with many large shareholders with regard to their view on the
discontinuance of a utility exploration and development program.
Mr. Harmon testified that the majority of MFS shareholders would
not support any further exploration or development program out of
the utility and that in his judgment, new capital could not be
raised for such purpose.

(Tr. 1137-9)
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The financial community regards oil and gas exploration as
one of the highest risk businesses with possible high returns
whereas the utility business is regarded as one of minimal risk
with a lower, regulated return.

The two concepts are not compati-

ble, because the Commission, while it might allow a higher return
for the higher risk, could never guarantee it and the equity investor will never swap the potential of a large return for a fixed
rate of return.

(TR. 1119, 1122, 1130-1)

If Mountain Fuel were to further explore as a utility in the
future, the Company could not raise capital for the program.

Look-

ing at the settlement Agreement, even though it is complex, Harmon
concluded that new capital could be raised to finance exploration
through the unregulated operations of Wexpro and Celsius.

(Tr.

1151)
R. Don Cash.

MFS called Mr. Cash, President of the Company.

Cash has a significant background in oil and gas exploration in
several areas of the United States, and especially in the Rocky
Mountains.

Mr. Cash testified that the Wexpro decision and the

pending litigation between MFS and Wexpro and the public agencies
had adversely affected the morale of exploration employees of the
Company.

Exploration engineers, geologists, and landmen are in
~

high demand and are extremely valuable.

Those employees do not

like their work subject to retroactive review when the program is
under utility regulation.

(Tr. 1475-6)

Cash stated that operators in the oil and gas industry shy
away from arrangements with regulated utility companies because
it is difficult to keep information confidential.

-23-
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Irmnediately

after the issuance of the Wexpro Opinion by the

Utah Supreme Court, MFS suspended its exploration program with
the exception of those activities that were necessary to preserve properties and meet contractual conunitments.

The Company

had ·no other choice in the matter, because the shareholders had
no further interest in the previously conducted program.
1479)

(Tr.

The exploration program of MFS continued to suffer after

issuance of the Wexpro Opinion and during the pendency of significant litigation.
Mr. Cash stated that wildcat exploration is high risk business, but even development drilling (in already discovered reservoirs) is not a "sure" bet, because much of the development
drilling will be on the rim or edge of the reservoir.

(Tr. 1480)

Mr. Cash stated that under the settlement Agreement, the
Utility Division of MFS did not surrender any cost-of-service
gas; those reserves were retained with a supply-life of about
12 years.

(Tr. 1483, 1496, 1507)

Although the settlement Agree-

ment concedes more to customers than MFS believed it should,
the Agreement is in the public interest.
the reasons.

Mr. Cash detailed

(Tr. 1486)

Ralph M. Kirsch.
dent and CEO of Wexpro.

Wexpro called as its witness Mr. Kirsch, PresiA lawyer by training with extensive

experience in oil and gas exploration·and negotiations, Kirsch
testified that his direct experience with MFS over many years was
that it cannot carry on a successful exploration program as a
regulated utility. (Tr. 1511-14)

Mr. Kirsch went on to say that
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while the additional allowance of 5% and 8% on capital investment
for development drilling of oil and gas reservoirs was reasonably necessary in the Agreement to cover unsuccessful drilling
costs in said reservoirs, the allowance would not be adequate
to cover wildcat exploration risks.

(Tr. 1118)

Of the wildcat

acreage, 56.2% of the leases will expire in four years, with

10.6% expiring in 1982, 21.1% in 1983, 8.9% in 1984 and 15.6%
in 1985.

(Tr. 1520)

Under the Agreement Wexpro has an obliga-

tion to expend $40 million in development drilling but there
are no internally generated funds with which to accomplish
that drilling.

(Tr. 1529)

Mr. Kirsch also explained how the 7% overriding royalty on
the unexplored acreage works.

An override is computed on the

gross value of production and does not share in any exploration,
development or production expenses.

As a consequence, the value

of the gross production is usually many times that of the net
value of production after costs and expenses.

Accordingly, Mr.

Kirsch testified, a 7% override couJ_d be more valuable than a
50, 60 or even 70% equity interest.

(Tr. 1523)

Mr. Kirsch stated that everything being considered, the
settlement Agreement providing for an unregulated exploration
12/
program, was fair to all interests.~ He emphasized that the
settlement must be viewed as a "whole".

If an attempt were made

to change one portion, then some other part of the settlement
would be impacted.

(Tr. 1515)

During the course of the Kirsch examination, legal counsel for the Division
and Conunittee as well as MFS and Wexpro expressed to the Conunission that
the Agreement reflected an attempt to free the exploration program, to
the extent possible, from utility type regulation.
(Tr. 1543, 1573)
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Lyle Hale.

Mr. Hale was called as an expert petroleum

geologist by the Division and Committee.

He was familiar with

MFS exploration properties, having worked in exploration for
MFS from 1951 through 1974.

Hale testified that in his opinion,

the settlement Agreement was in the public interest and in
particular, in the interest of the utility gas customer and that
the consideration to the utility for properties transferred to
Wexpro and Celsius represented fair market value.
Merrill R. Norman.

(Tr. 1331)

Mr. Norman, a CPA who testified in

opposition to the MFS-Wexpro agreements in 1977, testified that
the settlement Agreement is in the best interest of the customer.
(Tr 1279-80)

Gas from both oil and gas producing properties will

go to the utility at cost-of-service prices.

(Tr. 1298)

In

Norman's opinion, the Agreement is "far better" than the program
proposed in the original Wexpro proceedings of 1977.
Richard B. Rosenberg.

The only witness called by the Coal-

ition, Mr. Rosenberg is a recently employed staff attorney of
the California Public Utilities Commission.

While explaining

the functions of an exploration program in California, he expressly took no position on the merits of the Stipulation or
Agreement before the Commission. The Commission expressly so
found.

(See p. 5 of the Report and Order)

With the exception of Mr. Rosenberg, who took no position,
all of the witnesses testified that the settlement was in the
public interest.
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7.

Transfer of Exploration Acreage for Market Value.

The

Coalition maintained that the wildcat exploration acreage to
be transferred from Mountain Fuel to Celsius under the Agreement should be appraised on a dollar value basis in the traditional sense

an~

monies transferred for the benefit of the MFS

utility customers.

The Coalition failed to produce a shred of

testimony that the wildcat acreage could be meaningfully appraised by establishing a fixed dollar amount.
weig~t

The overwhelming

of the testimony is that it is neither customary nor

appropriate to appraise such properties in that manner.
Indeed, virtually every experienced witness who took the
stand, testified unequivocally that not only would a dollar
value appraisal be unavailing and futile, but that the 7% overriding royalty with a call on the gas constituted market value
for the transfer of the exploration acreage.

For example,

Howard Ritzma, testifying for the Division and Committee, with
vast experience in exploration activities, testified that the
7% gross overriding royalty and a first call on the gas at market
constituted fair market consideration for the transfer to Celsius
of the wildcat acreage (Tr. 1250), and the

2~%

royalty on the

Wexpro after-acquired property is "generous" to the utility
customer and reflects fair market value.

(Tr. 1251-2)

The 7%

overriding royalty on the wildcat acreage was, actually, higher
than usual.

(Tr. 1254)

Ritzma, stated, unequivocally, that it

is not reliable to fix the values in money of unexplored acreage
and that trying to estimate the volume of oil and gas in wildcat
acreage is "an exercise in futility."

-27-
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Mr. Hale, a consulting petroleum geologist, testified that
the 7% overriding royalty and the first call on gas at market
is a fair consideration for the transfer of the wildcat acreage
and that trying to place an appraised value, in the traditional
sense, on the properties would be "very speculative" -- ten
different geologists would give ten different answers -- a dollar
value would remain speculative until the property had been drilled and produced.

(Tr. 1333-5)

Mr. Roseman for the Division and Committee stated that
in his experience, transfers of interests in exploration acreage
in exchange for royalties is generally understood and accepted in
the industry.

(Tr. 1047)

Further, he testified that any attempt

to place a fixed dollar value, per acre, on the wildcat acreage
would be "very much a guess" and that what the Division and Committee did was to estimate "what the market would require in the
way of royalties" for a transfer of the acreage.

(Tr. 1045)

Rose-

man stated that in his experience, transfer of oil and gas properties would, in the great bulk of cases, be best valued on a
royalty percentage, that being "more or less traditional in the
industry".

(Tr. 1046)

Mr. Roseman estimated the 7% overriding

royalty on the wildcat acreage to be worth something like $7
million dollars per year to the utility gas customer.

-28-
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Ralph M. Kirsch, with years of experience in dealing with
wildcat acreage, testified that the 7% overriding royalty with
a call on the gas could be more valuable, in the market, than a
50%, 60%, or 70% equity interest in wildcat acreage.

(Tr. 1523)

The Commission expressly found in its Report and Order that
the properties, including the wildcat acreage, were transferred
"for fair market value as that value is typically deteimined in
the industry", and that "adequate benefits from the Settlement
redound to the benefit of customers of MFS".

(Finding #10 of

R. and O. p. 19)
8.

Report and Order, Findings and Conclusions of the Commission.

Throughout the days of testimony, the Commission evidenced considerable interest in and concern over various aspects of the Stipulation and Agreement.

Much questioning occurred both of witness

and counsel.
In its Report and Order, the Commission noted that the pending litigation was extremely difficult and had impaired the benefits of the exploration program to MFS customers as well as the
public interest, generally.

(R. and O. pp. 13, 14)

It was

noted that although the settlement Agreement was to be viewed
in total and not in separable units, the uncontested testimony
manifested that the individual properties had been transferred
for fair market value.

(R. and O. p. 16,

~16)
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The Commission expressly found as fact that the settlement
Agreement and Stipulation were just and reasonable, in the public
interest, and that the customers of MFS will be served by approval.
(Finding #11 p. 19 R. and O.)

The Commission concluded it had

jurisdiction to resolve the controversy and various cases before
it, that resolution of the contested issues under the Stipulation
and Agreement was in the public interest, that the Commission had
jurisdiction to review the transfer of the subject properties
between MFS and its subsidiaries and that such transfers were for
market value and in the public interest.

(Conclusion #5, R. and O.

p. 21)

In paragraph six of the Conclusions, the Commission stated
that the order was final and necessarily so:
because to insure the proper development of said
properties, the parties must be able to rely on the
finality of the Findings and Conclusions in regard
to the transfer of properties and apportionment
of benefits. The Commission also is entitled to
rely on the finality of its order.
(Conclusion 6,
R. and o. pp. 21, 22)
As part of the Order MFS was required to reflect in its
utility rates an annualized reduction of $21 million dollars
commencing January 30, 1982.

(R. and O. •S, p. 23)

That portion,

as well as other facets of the Order were implemented by MFS.

-30-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH,
ALONE, IS AUTHORIZED TO ESTABLISH
THE REGULATORY POLICY AND PUBLIC INTEREST
OF THIS STATE REGARDING THE FUNCTION OF
A PUBLIC UTILITY AND SUCH POLICY IS CONCLUSIVE,
UNLESS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO LAW.
The argument of Administrative Services and the Coalition by
Brief appears to be that this Court is authorized or entitled to
define the public interest and public policy of Utah with regard
to the regulation of a public utility.

The apparent theory is

that this Court should review the Findings and Conclusions of the
Report and Order of the Commission de novo, as to what is and is
not in the public interest of the public utility regulation of
MFS and further, that the decision of this Court in Committee of
Consumer Services (Wexpro Case), supra, somehow constitutes a
judicial decree mandating that the oil and gas exploration program
and properties of MFS be regulated and conducted in a specific
manner.

(See Administrative Services Br. p. 14, 15, 29, 46, 62

and 71)

It is, they suggest, as though this Court must assume

the clearly delineated legislative functions expressly delegated
to the PSC.

They would have this Court abandon its judicial

duties and assume the legislative (if not social) functions of
the Commission by undertaking the plenary review and

second~guessing

of every utility policy and public interest determination of the
Commission.
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The fundamental flaws in the argument of Administrative
Services and Coalition are obvious.

First, this Court does not

lay down the regulatory and public policy of Utah with regard to
public utilities, generally, or MFS, in particular.
tasks delegated by the legislature to the PSC.

These are

Second, this

Court did not carve out a judicial edict in Committee of Consumer
Services (Wexpro Case) that required a specific implementation
of a plan for the conduct or transfer of the MFS exploration
13/
program and properties.~ The jurisdiction of this Court to review
on certiorari an order of the Public Service Commission is defined
and limited by Statute.

Section 54-7-16 of the Utah Code Annotated

(Repl. vol. 1974) provides:
The review shall not be extended further
than to determine whether the commission
has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the.order or
decision under review violates any right of
the petitioner under the Constitution of the
United States or of the state of Utah.
The
findings and conclusions of the commission
on questions of fact shall be final and shall
not be subject .to review. Such questions of
fact shall include ultimate facts and the
findings and conclusions of the commission on
reasonableness and discrimination.
(Emphasis
added.)
In recognition of that limited scope of review, this Court
has long held that it should not involve itself in determinations
of the policy supporting or the wisdom behind a Commission deter-

13/

The scope and meaning of the decision of the Court in Committee of
Consumer Services (Wexpro Case), supra, has been the subject of extended and wide-ranging debate in this Case and otherwise. Whether the
holding of the Case was one squarely on the jurisdiction of the Commission over the classified non-utility oil properties with the balance
of the opinion being dicta, or whether the many statements of the
majority Opinion were---a:r:i-central and primary to the reversal of the
Commission Order, it is clear that the Opinion does not mandate specific regulatory conduct and continued supervision of MFS oil and gas
exploration and development.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

minat1on.

In Mulcahy v. Public Service Comm'n, 101 Utah 245,

117 P.2d 298 (1941), this Court noted:
What policy should be pursued, or what
conclusions should be drawn from disputed facts·is not a law question for
the judiciary to decide.
In Lewis v. Wycoff Co., 18 Utah 2d 255, 420 P.2d 264

(1966) this

Court reaffirmed the principles annunciated in Mulcahy as follows:
It is not our prerogative to pass upon the
wisdom of the Commission's decision.
It is
charged with the responsibility of general
supervision and regulation of the common carriers of this state and of seeing that the
public receives the most efficient and economical service possible.
See also, Union Pac. R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 103 Utah 459,
135 P. 2d 915 (1943).
So long as·the decision of the Public Service Commission
is in conformance with the law, this Court's review is addressed
to a determination of whether there is reasonably competent
evidence in the record to support the findings of fact and
declarations of policy and public interest made by the Commission.
See, Williams v. Public Service Cornm'n, 29 Utah 2d 9, 504 P.2d
34 (1972); Ashworth Transfer Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 2

Utah 2d 23, 268 P.2d 990 (1954).
The lip service that Administrative Services and the Coalition
pay to this plainly stated case law is outweighed by their insistent request that this Court set the regulatory policy for the
Commission regarding oil and gas exploration of MFS and that the
earlier Wexpro decision be transformed from a judicial opinion
to a legislative decree.

This Court's opinion, invalidating the

prior J.E.A., did not even purport to design a program for the

-33-
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future exploration and development of the properties, but
correctly left the designing of a new one for the parties and
the Commission.

That is all that has been done in the instant

case.
All parties did agree that the past exploration program
had resulted in the acquisition of valuable properties and
that it was in the public interest to explore and develop the
properties in order to enhance gas supplies for the utility.
But the Court, in Wexpro, did not (and could not for that
matter) dictate how the properties were to be developed.
This Court was correct in refusing to attempt to usurp
the powers of the Commission by fashioning legislative policy
and dictating the method of conducting an oil and gas exploration
program.

Why Administrative Services and the Coalition now argue

from the record in the old case and urge this Court to make a
decision establishing public policy based on the record in
that case, is a mystery.
The facts, issues, and record established before the
Commission in this matter are not those of the earlier Case,
and although the language of the 1979 Opinion has been observed
in the Stipulation and Agreement reached by the parties in this
Case, the instant record and issues stand on their own feet.
The established statutory and case law are controlling.
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POINT II
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ARE FAVORED BY STATUTE
IN UTAH AND IN THE LAW GENERALLY
1.

The Law Generally.
Administrative Services is sharply critical of the parties

for having resolved and settled this long running and complex
Wexpro dispute.

It implies that the compromise of contested liti-

gation is in some way sinister, if not immoral, and that the
Corrunission somehow lacked the authority or power to approve the
settlement.

The law is to the contrary.

ment are encouraged.

Compromise and settle-

The policy behind the fostering of settle-

ments of disputed litigation has been well stated by the Kansas
Supreme Court in International Motor Rebuilding v. United Motor
Exchange, Inc., 193 Kan. 497, 393 P.2d 992 (1964).

At 393 P.2d

995, the Court put it this way:
The law favors the amicable settlement of
disputes. Compromise as a mode of adjusting
claims should be encouraged by the courts.
It would be against public policy to prevent
compromise of claims by compelling all controversies to be adjusted by litigation.
[citations omitted]
A compromise does not anticipate that
the rights of the parties have been settled
with exact nicety.
Courts should not be concerned with the exactness of the accounting
between the parties in considering the
validity of a compromise.
For similar

hol~ings,

see, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Christie, 125

Ariz. 38, 607 P.2d 21 (1980}; Wheeler v. McNett, 281 Ore. 485, 575
p. 2d 6 4 9

( 19 7 8) •

Moreover, the party challenging the relief has the burden of
proof, by clear and convincing evidence and only for the strongest
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reasons, that the settlement should be set aside by the Court.
Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Tiger Enterprises, 99 Idaho 539, 585
P.2d 949 (1978).

The foregoing principles apply with equal force

to the settlement of contested proceedings before administrative
agencies. Continental Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 373 F.2d
96 (10th Cir. 1967); Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Federal
Power Corrun'n, 306 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1962).
2.

The Commission is Expressly Authorized by Utah Statute to
Accept Settlements of the Parties.
Not only are settlements of disputes pending before ad-

ministrative agencies favored by the courts, settlements of
disputes before the Utah PSC have been expressly authorized
and recognized by the Utah Legislature as being in the public interest.

In the recently enacted Amendment to Secti.on 54-7-10 (1)

Utah Code Ann.

(Supp. 1981), the legislature declared:

At any time before or during a hearing or proceeding before the commission, the parties
between themselves or with the commission or
any commissioner, may engage in settlement conferences and negotiations. The commission may
·at its sole discretion adopt any settlement
propo·sal of the parties and enter an order
based upon such proposal if it deems such action proper. (Emphasis added.)
The Commission was unquestionably acting within its statutorily
delegated authority and in the declared public interest when it
examined and in its discretion, approved after full hearing, the
Stipulation and Agreement.
As will be discussed hereinafter, the Stipulation and
Agreement in this case satisfy the concerns expressed by this
Court in its earlier Wexpro Opinion, result in long term benefits
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to MFS, its customers and its shareholders, saves the Company
exploration program and is in the public interest.

Admini-

strative Services and the Coalition have simply failed to meet
their burden in challenging this Settlement, and the Order of the
PSC approving and implementing the same should be sustained on
this appeal.
3.

The Claim of Appellants is Specious.
Administrative Services and the Coalition argue that the

Opinion of this Court in Wexpro constituted a judicial mandate to
the PSC to collapse all the oil properties into the utility accounts in establishing rates of MFS and to force MFS to explore.
(Adm. Serv. Br. 73-4, Coalition Br. 10)
Whatever might be said about the range of the wexpro Opinion,
no one can reasonably argue that the decision was a decree and
mandate to implement a judicially fashioned remedy of utility
regulation.

That simply isn't the business of this Court.

Under

all the authority of this Court, utility policy and regulation
lies solely with the Conunission.

The citation by Appellants of

the Antitrust divestiture decree of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Utah Public Service Conun'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
14/

395 U.S. 464 (1969) ~·reflects the desperation of their position.
with

The federal courts are specifically charged by Congress
enforcement of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts,

15 USC §§1 et seq.
federal judges in

Remedial relief is indeed fashioned by
f~deral

antitrust litigation.

But the

Utah Supreme Court can hardly be said to be in the same position
~

Significantly, El Paso did not involve any proceedings before or
appeal from the Utah Commission. The PSC was only an amicus curiae.
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in enforcement of utility regulation in Utah.

The attempt to use

El Paso and other similar cases as an analogy here is specious.
POINT III
THE VARIOUS CONCEPTS OF LAW
IDENTIFIED IN THE WEXPRO APPEAL
WERE RECOGNIZED BY THE PSC ON REHEARING
AND INCORPORATED IN THE STIPULATION
AND AGREEMENT OF SETTLEMENT
A.

The PSC Was Free to Fashion a New Remedy Which Met the
Legal Requirements Enunciated in the Wexpro Decision.
Admistrative Services and the Coalition would have this

Court limit the discretion of the PSC on remand to the mere implementation of a very specific and pre-determined remedy fashioned largely out of their own boot strapping arguments intermingled with occasional dicta from the majority Wexpro Opinion.
The part of the PSC cannot, under applicable case law, be so
limited; it is free, within the law, to fashion a new and different solution to the problem.
The watershed case on this issue is F.C.C. v. Pottsville
Broadcasting, 309 U.S. 134(1940).

In that case, a broadcasting

company sought a permit from the F.C.C. for the construction of a broadcasting station.

The Commission denied the .ap-

plication, finding that the respondent was financially disqualified.

The Company appealed, and the Circuit Court reversed and

remanded, holding that the Commission's conclusion regarding the
respondent's lack of financial qualification was based on an
erroneous understanding of Pennsylvania law.
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Following the remand, the Corrunission set the Company's
application for argument along with two rival applications which
had been filed subsequent to the Company's.

Pottsville at this

stage sought and obtained from the Court of Appeals a writ of
mandamus commanding the Commission to first hear and reconsider the
Company's prior application "on the basis of the record as originally made".
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the determination
of the Circuit Court that the Commission had failed to follow
the Court's mandate.

In that regard, the Supreme Court said:

This was not a mandate from court to court
but from a court to an administrative agency
• • • . A review by a federal court of the
action of a lower court is only one phase of
a single unified process. But to the extent
that a-federal court is authorized to review
an administrative act, there is superimposed
upon the enforcement of the legislative policy
through administrative control a different
process from that out of which the administrative action under review ensued.

***

On review, the court may thus correct errors of law and on remand the Corrunission is
bound to act upon the correction. Federal
Power Corrun'n v. Pacific Co., 307 U.S. 156.
But an administrative determination in
which is embedded a leg~l question open to
judicial review does not impliedly foreclose
the administrative agency, after its error
has been corrected, from enforcing the legislative policy committed to its charge.
Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 305 U.S. 364 . • . .
The Commission's responsibility at all
times is to measure applications by the standard of 'public convenience, interest, ot
necessity' • • . • The fact that in its first
disposition the Commission had committed a
legal error did not create rights of priority
in the respondent, as against the later applicants, which it would not have otherwise
possessed. {Emphasis added.) (309 U.S. at
141, 145-46)
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The decision in Pottsville has been repeatedly followed
by the U.S. Supreme Court in support of the proposition that
an administrative agency may examine a matter after remand on a
new record and make a decision based on new considerations.
See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Cornrn'n v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194 (1947); F.P.C. v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952).
In the most recent Supreme Court case, N.L.R.B. v. Food Store
Emoloyees Union, 417 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court stated:
It is a guiding principle of administrative law, long recognized by this Court, "that
an administrative determination in which is
embedded a legal question open to judicial review does not impliedly foreclose the admiriistrati ve agency, after its error has been corrected, from enforcing the legislative policy
committed to its charge" . . . Application
of that general principle in this case best
respects the congressional scheme investing
the Board and not the courts with broad powers
to fashion remedies that will effectuate
national labor policy. (417 U.S. at 9-11)
See also Ten·nessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comrn'n, 606 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and Empire Electric
Ass'n v. Public Service Cornrn'n, 604 P.2d 930 (Utah 1979).
Thus on the remand from this Court, the PSC had the authority
and discretion to take a fresh and new approach, within the legal
bounds of the law, to the questions- surrounding the exploration
and development program of MFS.

That is precisely what the Com-

mission did.
The Coalition, in three of the four points in its Brief,
asserts that the PSC erred in not following some imagined allencompassing mandate of this Court.

The case law cited by the

-40-
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Coalition in support of this position, however, is fully consistent with and relies upon the United States Supreme Court cases
cited hereinabove.

All that is required by those cases is that

the Commission on remand fashion a remedy which is consistent
with the law as declared by the Court.

As will be demonstrated

hereinafter, the Commission did just that.
B.

The Order of the PSC Recognizes and Meets the Requirements
of the Wexpro Decision.
It is clear that the PSC did not act outside of the dis-

cretion cormnitted to it in approving the remedy fashioned by the
parties in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement.

That

Stipulation and Agreement, and the order of the PSC approving
same, clearly meet both the strict legal requirements of the
Wexpro decision, as well as the more general observations of the
Court therein.
1.

Jurisdiction of the PSC Over Transfer to Wexpro.

The

fundamental issue in the Wexpro appeal was the determination by
the PSC that it did not have jurisdiction over the transfer to
Wexpro of the historically classified non-utility oil properties of MFS.

The settlement Agreement moots the issue of juris-

diction by simply recognizing, for settlement purposes, the
Commission's jurisdiction over all properties included in the
transaction.
2.

The Transfers to Wexpro as Approved by the Settlement

Agreement Are In the Public Interest.

The determination of the

public interest requires a balancing between the interests of
utility customers in having reasonable rates and reliable service with those of utility shareholders in obtaining an adequate
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return on their investment.

See Utah Power & Light Co. v.

Public Service Conun'n, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542 (1944).

With-

out exception, each industry expert who testified before the
Conunission in the remand proceedings agreed that the settlement
Agreement and Stipulation were in the public interest and in the
interest of the ratepayer, the shareholder, and MFS itself.
The interest of the utility customers in having reasonable
rates is protected by the settlement Agreement in insuring that
natural gas produced in conjunction with existing oil and gas
reservoirs will come to the utility at cost of service.

(Stipula-

tion §§ 3.3.2 and 3.3.6) In addition, the utility is given a
valuable first call on natural gas located and produced in the
unexplored wildcat acreage at third-party market prices.
tion §3.3.5)

(Stipul-

The utility will also receive a 7% overriding

royalty interest on all oil and gas produced from the wildcat
acreage (Stipulation §3.3.4), which will assuredly result in net
gas costs at substantially below market prices.
The interests of the utility customers in a continued reliable source of supply of natural gas, which has been repeatedly
recognized by the PSC as a critical factor in determining the
15/

public interest,

is also recognized in the settlement.

The

Agreement provides the necessary incentives to attract the new
investment capital required to continue the exploration and development program (Tr. 1023, 1029-30) which should supply MFS with
a secure supply of gas for years to come.

The settlement in

15/ The Utah Public Service Commission expressly recognized the importance of
securing future supplies of natural gas as a primary factor in assessing
the public interest in orders issued in PSC Case Nos. 6329, 5907, 4797,
4392, and 3650.
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turn recognizes the interest of the shareholders to an adequate
return on their investment by providing for an unregulated rate
of return on high risk investment capital.

Lastly, the public is

served generally by providing incentives for the discovery and
development of domestic oil and gas supplies.
Thus, it is clear that the settlement Agreement balances the
interests of the utility shareholders and customers, as well as
the public.

The Agreement is not tilted in favor of the share-

holders of MFS (indeed, against them if anything, under the testimony of Roseman and Harmon) and the Commission did not err in
finding that the Settlement met the public interest.
3.

The Transfers to Wexpro Were for Fair Market Con-

sideration.

Again, without exception, those expert witnesses

who spoke to the issue in testimony before the PSC stated that
both the traditional and preferable method of setting market
value for the transfer of interests in oil and gas properties is
through the use of royalty or profit interests expressed in terms
of a percentage of gross or net revenues.
simple.

The concept is quite

The more oil and gas that is found, the more valuable is

the property and the greater will be the consideration secured for
its sale or transfer.

The less oil and gas discovered, the smal-

ler is the value of the property and the smaller will be the
consideration returned to the seller.

The only question that

remains is what is a fair percentage.
The testimony was without contradiction that the percentage
of oil revenues allocated to the utility for the benefit of its
customers from producing oil properties and the percentage royalty
on the unexplored acreage were fair and perhaps even above what
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could have been expected in the litigation.

(Tr. 1024-29,

1254, 1325-31, 1502, 1523) The consideration given thus complies with the requirements of this Court in the prior Wexpro
decision.
In contending that the transfers were not for fair market
value, Administrative Services and Coalition overlook or
deliberately ignore the other salient factors which were taken
into consideration by the parties in determining whether the
properties were transferred for fair market value.

The Stipula-

tion provides in pertinent part:
The Stipulation and Agreement are an integrated whole and each part is dependent on
all other parts . . . • The totality of the
consideration flowing to the Company [for the
benefit of customers] under the Agreement is
agreed, by the parties, in view of all the
circumstances, to be the equivalent of fair
market value for all assets transferred from
the Company to Wexpro • • . .
(Stipulation §§3.1 and 3.2)

By their failure to recognize

the integrated nature of the settlement provisions and their
interdependency upon each other, Administrative Services and
Coalition present a very misleading and incomplete picture of
the issue of fair consideration.
4.

Benefits to Ratepayers.

This Court expressed concern in

the Wexpro decision that under the earlier arrangements, the gas
customers of MFS had not been given enough benefit for the inclusion in rates of some operating expenses incurred in connection
with the exploration program, and that such benefit should have
been reflected by some sort of an interest in the acquisition
and development of the oil properties which MFS had been histori-44Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cally required to classify in its non-utility account.

The

settlement Agreement clearly meets and satisfies this concern.
MFS retains ownership of the gas from existing gas producing
reservoirs and brings into its system all gas produced currently
or in the future, from such existing gas reservoirs at cost of
service, and gets full credit for the value of all existing oil
production from such reservoirs.

Such arrangement assures con-

tinued supplies of low cost gas for the benefit of the customers.
The Agreement now also allocates to MFS all gas at cost of service
currently being produced or developed in the future from the existing oil properties transferred to Wexpro.

In addition, 54 per-

cent of the net revenues from the sale of oil produced from said
oil properties comes to the MFS utility account for the benefit
of its customers.

This is over and above the $21 million one

time reduction in utility rates of MFS.

As to the unexplored

wildcat acreage, MFS is entitled to a 7 percent overriding royalty interest on all hydrocarbons produced, as well as first
call on the gas and Wexpro and Celsius assume all the costs and
risks of such production.

In each of .the above described situa-

tions, the consideration flows directly to the ratepayer in the
form of reduced gas rates.
Additional benefits to customers as a result of the settlement include: all risk and expense of development drilling in
producing gas reservoirs is to be borne by Wexpro; a 2-1/2%
overriding royalty interest on approximately 128,000 acres of
exploration properties acquired independently by Wexpro; a
2-1/2% overriding royalty on certain producing acreage
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independently acquired by Wexpro; reduction in utility rate
base by removal of all leaseholds from rate base acdounts,
thereby reducing utility revenue requirements; elimination of
all unsuccessful exploration and development expenses from
ratemaking consideration resulting in reduced utility rates;
productive gas reservoirs; and, an agreement by Wexpro to pay
to the Utility for the purpose of reducing rates to customers,
the amount of $250,000 per year for each of the next 12 years.
(See Stipulation §3)
The settlement Agreement unquestionably meets all of the
criteria discussed by the Wexpro Opinion.
5.

Ratepayers Do Not Contribute to the Exploration ·and

Development Program.

The majority opinion in Wexpro expressed

concern that the traditional roles of investor and customer
had, to some extent, been reversed.

Rather than simply paying

for the cost of services rendered, this Court suggested that
MFS ratepayers had made a ''capital contribution to a speculative
venture for the purpose of developing oil and gas sources."
(Wexpro decision at p. 876)

While MFS does not concede

th~t

the

customer ever made a capital payment to exploration prior to the
1979 Opinion, it is clear that any concern over the matter has
been completely removed under the settlement Agreement as
approved by the PSC.

All the costs of exploration and develop-

ment of both developmental wells in known oil and gas reservoirs, as well as wildcat drilling on the unexplored acreage
will be borne by Wexpro/Celsius, and thus by the share-46-
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holders.

The risk capital is provided solely by the investor

and the shareholder and ratepayer of MFS are each re-established
in their traditional roles.
6.

The Agreement Does Not Violate the No-Profits-to-

Affiliates Rule.

This Court's reference in the Wexpro Opinion

to the no-profit-to-affiliates rule is general in its treatment
and makes no attempt to specifically define the scope of the
rule.

An examination of the case law relied upon by the Court,

as well as other authorities, does add some definition to the
rule and as so defined, it is clear that the settlement does not
violate the rule.
The no-profit-to-affiliates rule originated early in the
history of utility regulation.

It is based upon the principle

that a utility, by creating an affiliate to perform

a service or

provide a product, cannot use that captive supplier as a ruse to
make inordinately high profits at the expense of its customers.
The rule has never stood for the principle, however, that the
affiliate would be limited to charging its bare costs with no
return on its invested capital.
In the recent case of Central Telephone v. State Corporation

Comm'n, 252 S.E.2d 575 (Va. 1979), the Virginia Commission reduced
expenses claimed by the utility for certain services and products
furnished by an affiliate because the payment of those expenses
would yield to the affiliate a greater return on capital than
the utility was permitted to earn.

On appeal, the Virginia Supreme

Court reversed and remanded, holding that the price paid by the
utility to the affiliate was not unreasonable under the circumstances.

The Court said:
-47-
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We are unwilling to approve this action
of the Commission. While it is the duty of
the Commission to scrutinize prices paid by
a utility to an affiliated supplier, we find
no evidence in this case that the expenses incurred by Central in the purchase of its supplies
were exhorbitant, unnecessary, wasteful, extravagant, or incurred in the abuse of discretion
or in bad faith. [citations omitted]
On the
contrary, there is affirmative evidence that
the prices paid by Central were as reasonable
as it could have obtained elsewhere • . . .
We observe that there is no evidence of
of any advantage taken by Central of its affiliated relationship with Service Company to
the detriment of Central and its customers.
Neither is there any evidence that Service
Company, in its affiliated relationship with
Central, enJoys a unique position of market
power which renders a comparison of prices
and profits with those of other suppliers
inadequate as a measure of reasonableness.
(Emphasis added.) (252 S.E. 2d at 585)
In the Wexpro decision, this Court quoted a short section
from Florida Gas Transmission Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 362
F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1966), which merely states the no-profit-toaffiliates rule in the most general of terms.

The Fifth Circuit

·had no reason to address the rule in any greater detail, since it
held the rule

wa~

not applicable to the facts of that case.

The

so-called subsidiary was not actually under the control of the
"parent" and as a consequence, the prices set were the result of
arms length neogitations.

The rule should similarly be inappli-

cable here since, as the accountant Walker noted, the terms of
this settlement, including the price of gas coming from Wexpro,
were not fixed by MFS and its affiliate, but were the result of·
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arm's-length negotiations with the Division and the Committee
(Tr. 1200).
This Court, in Wexpro, also cited Utah Power & Light Co. v.
Public Service Comm'n, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542 (1944).

The

fact situation there was again quite different from this case.
Utah Power & Light (UP&L) and the Phoenix Companies, which had
constructed a plant for UP&L, were subsidiaries of Electric Bond &
Share.

The Commission disallowed in UP&L's rate base any cost

for the plant in excess of the reasonable costs that Phoenix
expended in the construction.

The Phoenix mark-up, referred to

as the "Phoenix-fees," were rejected because Phoenix appeared to
be merely a shell company without assets or employees and rendering no service to anyone.

It merely acted as a conduit to facili-

tate the marking up of costs by Electric Bond & Share which had
effectively done all the work.

In sustaining the PSC, this

Court noted:
The Commission held and the evidence discloses
that the Phoenix Companies had no assets of
their own. The Phoenix Utility Company, successor to other Phoenix companies, had only
nominal capitalization and substantially no
direct overhead costs or administrative
organization distinct from that of Electric
Bond &.Share Company . . . In view of the
evidence showing that every service rendered
by Electric Bond & Share Company was billed as
an item of cost; that all employees were
compensated by the Company; that part of the
overhead expense of the New York off ices was
allocated to the Utah construction; and the further fact that there were no assets or employees of
Electric Bond & Share that were shown to have been
devoted to or employed in connection with the
construction for the Company which were not paid
for by the Company, we cannot hold that the
Commission was arbitrary in refusing to include
in the rate base an additional amount representing
additional payments to Electric Bond & Share
Company in connection with this construction. (107
Utah at 194).
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This Court went on to point out that the rule there applied
was limited to the particular facts of the case.

The Court

specifically noted that it was not faced with
the situation under which the subsidiary corporation has substantial separate assets of its
own, for as will be subsequently noted, the
Phoenix companies had no assets. (107 Utah at
193)
The facts of the Utah Power & Light case are simply inapposite to the case at bar.
tion.

Wexpro is not merely a shell corpora-

It maintains its own separate offices and employees, inclu-

ding a professional oil and gas exploration staff, and owns substantial oil and gas properties, including properties and interests acquired independently of MFS.
aged and financed.

Wexpro is separately man-

In short, the facts under which this Court

applied the no-profit-to-affiliates rule in Utah Power & Light
are totally different from those extant in the instant case.
Finally, Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 424
F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1969), cited by this Court, does not require
rejection of the settlement.

There the Circuit Court upheld. the

Federal Power Commission's requirement that the utility pay the
cost of service, rather than the contract price, for gas obtained
from the subsidiary.

The cost of service applied by the FPC

however, included a return on capital to the subsidiary; the
allowance was not confined to merely out-of-pocket costs.
More importantly, however, the Cities Service case is simply
out of date.

In more recent time, the FPC, its successor the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Congress have, in
order to encourage exploration and development activities, specifically recognized the right of exploration subsidiaries of jurisd~ctional

pipeline companies to be paid market prices for gas sold
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to their parent.
§§

Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15

u.s.c.

3301 (21) and 343l(b) (1) (E); FPC Opinion No. 770, 10 Fed.

Power Service 5-293 (FPC 1976); FPC Opinion No. 699-H, 52 F.P.C.
1604 (1974); Opinion No. 568, 42 F.P.C. 38 (1969).

In fact, even

where the pipeline company itself is conducting exploration,
FERC allows the pipeline market prices in its rate. Order No.

2.!!_, Dkt. No. RM 80-6, 21 Fed. Power Service 5-199 (FPC 1980).
This pricing policy has been determined to be in the national
public interest.
The.practical experience in the oil and gas industry as related by the expert witnesses is also supportive of a limited
application of the no-profit-to-affiliates rule.

Mr. Roseman

testified that in his experience the rule is applied where the
affiliate has a captive market in the utility customer because
the product cannot be acquired by the utility elsewhere.

The

rule is then applied to avoid excessive profits to the affiliate.
(Tr. 1037-38)
Mr. Walker testified that the rule was designed to prevent
excessive profits resulting from a price set other than on an arm's
length basis.

He said this settlement would not violate the rule

since the prices used in the Agreement were agreed to by the Division and Committee in tough,
01)

arm's~length

negotiations. (Tr. 1200-

Mr. O'Leary, testifying for the shareholders, stated that in

his experience the rule is.designed to insure that prices paid to
an affiliate are not in excess of a competitive value.
settlement in the instant

~ase

The

clearly meets each of the real
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life criteria set by said expert witnesses.
Under the Agreement, MFS will be obtaining gas in four different situations involving an affiliate.
First, gas from established gas reservoirs will continue to
belong to MFS and will be priced at cost of service.

Wexpro

will operate the fields and will receive its costs, including a
"utility" indexed return, for any future capital investment associated with its services.

No possible violation of the no-profit-

to-affiliates rule is involved.
Second, MFS will purchase from Wexpro at cost of service,
gas produced from the established oil reservoirs.

Again, the

no-profit-to-affiliates rule is not violated.
Third, MFS has a 7% overriding royalty interest on all
hydrocarbon production, plus first right to purchase at market
prices, all gas produced from unexplored properties which are
being transferred to Celsius.

The market prices will be deter-

mined on the basis of third-party standards and will be the same
price at which MFS could acquire the· gas from other producers.
Recovery of the royalty payment will assuredly result in net gas
prices that are below market prices.

(Tr. 1457-8) Even assuming

arguendo that the purchases violate the no-profit-to-affiliate
rule, the first right would then be void and the rule would not
be violated since there would be no sale.
Finally, MFS has a first right to purchase at market prices
gas produced by Wexpro from certain of its independently acquired
properties.

If these purchase are determined to violate the
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no-profit-to-affiliates rule, the first right will be void.

No

sale will take place and the rule will not otherwise be violated.
POINT IV
THE OBJECTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AND COALITION
TO THE SETTLEMENT ARE NOT WELL TAKEN
A great many of the arguments of 'the Administrative Services
and Coalition are answered 'both directly and implicitly in other
sections of this Brief.

There are, however, several particular

statements regarding the settlement made by these Appellantswwhich
are so out of harmony with the evidence that they merit
special attention.
1.

MFS Could Not do All Development and Wildcat Drilling

on These "Joint" Properties at an Assured Cost of Service Price
Which Would be Less Than Market.

Administrative Services makes

the bald assumption that the utility could do the exploratory
drilling and development of the wildcat properties with resulting cost-of-service prices for any gas discovered that would
assuredly be below the prevailing market price.

This assumption

has no evidentiary base whatsoever.
To the contrary, the evidence shows that MFS would have a
\,

difficult, if not impossible, time raising the capital to drill
as a utility.

(Tr. 1026, 1043, 1060, 1230, 1512)

In that

regard, the Company had made the determinatin for legitimate
business reasons that it could not and would not conduct a regu-
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lated exploration program.

Any attempt to force an involuntary

drilling program by order of the Commission would not likely
be successful.

(Tr. 1073, 1203, 1227)

A successful drilling

program is dependent on highly trained and skilled personnel
and a forced and regulated drilling program would have little
chance in a competitive world of keeping these personnel.
Moreover, many of these properties are in deep-drilling areas
(Tr. 1457) where it is desirable to share the risk and industry
people are reluctant to join in a venture with a regulated
company.

(Ritzma Tr. 1267, Roseman Tr. 1034, Cash Tr. 1477,

Kirsch Tr. 1513)
Even if, for the sake of sheer argument, it were assumed
that the utility could somehow be forced to drill, there is no
guarantee that it would be successful, or that cost of service
would be below market.

O'Leary testified that cost of service

could exceed market if there were a series of unsuccessful wells
(Tr. 1231), and Crawford stated that it is impossible to know beforehand whether cost-of-service gas prices will be more or
less than market prices, especially when the benefits to
customers of the 7% overriding royalty interest are taken into
account.

(Tr. 1457) It was his opinion that the settlement re-

sulted in greater benefits for customers than did the traditional
"straight line" cost of service approach used in past years.
(Tr. 1458) Mr. Kirsch testified that the 7% overriding royalty
interest on all hydrocarbons produced on the exploratory properties could well be worth more than a 50%, 60%, or 70%
equity interest in the acreage.

(Tr. 1523)

Accordingly, the
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supposition that the utility would assuredly come out better

if it drilled and developed the wildcat acreage is pure speculation.
Moreover, any program which would insure cost-of-service
gas on the wildcat acreage necessarily would involve ratepayer
participation because, as already noted, it would be extremely
unlikely that investors would fund such a program.

Yet such

ratepayer participation would again result in the reversal of
traditional roles between customer and investor earlier condemned by this Court.

In contrast, under the settlement there

is no customer participation in the capital costs and dry
hole expenses associated with either the exploration and
development of new acreage, or with the drilling of development wells in established gas and oil reservoirs.

These costs

fall solely on the shoulders of the shareholders.
Clearly, the unsupported assertion of Administrative Services
that the approval of the Agreement may have cost the ratepayers
$500 million is fictional -sensationalism that serves no useful
function in resolving this complicated litigation.
2.

The Agreement Pays More Than "Lip Service" to Cost-

0£-Service Gas.

Rather than paying mere lip service to the

concept of cost-of-service gas, as Administrative Services argues, the Agreement takes great pains to secure gas at the
lowest rates reasonably possible for the customers of MFS.
If there is one thing that is abundantly clear from the record
before the Commission it is that the exploration and development
program, as it has been operated since the inception of MFS,
is finished.

That program had included so-called joint proper-55-
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ties, consisting of producing oil and gas reservoirs and wildcat acreage held for further development.

In the producing

reservoirs, discovery wells have been completed, but not all
of the development wells necessary to define the limits of
the reservoirs and economically produce the f ieldB have been
fully drilled.

The wildcat acreage is, of course, undrilled

and untested.
All of the gas currently produced from these so-called
joint properties, as well as gas produced from development
wells in known producing reservoirs, goes to the utility at
cost of service.

This is certainly more than "lip service."

There is a significant difference between the cost-of-service
gas from wells drilled in the past and today's market price.
The present wells

which are now producing gas were drilled

at various times over the past decade or so.

The drilling

costs and the. investment in these presently producing gas
wells is known.

The operating expenses are foreseeable. The

cost of service to produce the gas from these presently producing wells.drilled years ago is below the market price.
The market price of "old" gas of similar vintage or age is
going steadily upward as the federal government allows producers to increase prices in order to stimulate more production
and to compete with world energy prices.
As the market price continues to go up with deregulation of
gas or for other reasons, the spread between cost-of-service gas
from presently existing wells drilled years ago and market
prices will increase.

There is, thus, a known and specific benefit

to the customer in getting all of the gas from all of the presently producing wells at cost-of-service prices.
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The settlement Agreement also takes a giant step toward
ensuring that the development drilling will provide cost-ofservice gas at less than market prices.

If, for example, wexpro

or Celsius drill 17 consecutive dry holes,

(as actually happened

to another company Tr. 1033), the heavy expense of such failure
will not be passed on to the customer under the Agreement.

If

they find new gas, an incremental incentive allowance (8% on
successful, commercial gas wells and 5% on successful oil
wells) is provided for

(Agreement

·ssrr-8,

III-5) to help compen-

sate for these costs and the dry hole risks.

There is, thus_, a

lid fixed by the Agreement and, if there should be a run of
bad luck, those costs cannot be passed on to the ratepayer
in cost-of-service gas or otherwise.
On all of the 1.4 million wildcat acres, MFS has a call
on the gas at market prices, but it is absolutely certain
that it will not result in the customer paying full market prices because there is an offsetting 7% overriding royalty on all
production.

Thus, if a wildcat well is drilled on the exploratory

acreage and it is dry, the loss is totally Celsius.

If some

gas or oil is discovered, Celsius pays the 7% royalty to MFS and
all of the costs, even if it is a marginal well.

There is no

evidence that the price to the customer would be lower under
some other program.

In fact, there was some concern that the

deep and expensive drilling MFS may be required to do could result in cost-of-service exceeding market prices.
1457)

(Tr. 1231,

As a result of the costs associated with the deep drilling

required to explore the wildcat acreage, the 7% royalty might
-57-
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well be more valuable to the utility than cost-of-service gas.
(Tr. 1457)
The Settlement Agreement has been carefully drafted to
secure for the customers of MFS gas at the lowest reasonable
rates.

The concept of cost-of-service gas is the very founda-

tion of that low cost gas.

It clearly receives more than lip

service in the settlement.
3.

Although Title to the Producing Oil Reservoirs Was Left

With Wexpro, The Statement on p. 47 of the Brief of Administrative Services to the Effect That These Remain Wexpro's Sole and
Exclusive Property is Wrong.
course, reside somewhere.

Title to the property must, of

While who has naked title is of little

legal significance,-in this case, placing title with the driller
does have significant operating advantages and does simplify the
obtaining of permits, the negotiation of farm out and unit agreements, and reduces costs.

What is important in the context of the

settlement, however, is what happens to the benefits from those
properties.
The Agreement (§II-5, p.19) expressly provides that the gas
which is produced in association with the oil from producing oil
reservoirs will be sold, to the utility at cost-of-service computed
in the same way the Corrunission presently computes it; under prior
programs, such gas was sold at field prices.

The Agreement also

contemplates that the oil revenue, after deduction of the operating expenses and the agreed return on capital, is divided 54%
to the utility and 46% to Wexpro.

(Agreement, §II-4, pp. 17-18)

The Settlement expressly requires that the utility's share of the
oil revenues will be used to reduce rates.

(Stipulation, §2.1,
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p.9}

As a consequence, MFS retains a very real and beneficial

interest in the subject properties.
4.

The 5% Incentive Allowance for Successful Development

Oil Drilling and 8% Incentive Allowance for Successful Development Gas Drilling Does Not Provide a 21% and 24% Return.

Admin-

istrative Services asserts (p.52 of its Brief) that the allowance
of 5% incentive return on investment for successful development
oil drilling and 8% on successful development gas drilling allows
,~ett

MFS's affiliate Wexpro a 21% and 24% return on invested capital,
respectively.

The claim is absolutely false.

It must be noted, as the Certified Public Accountant witness Walker testified, a development and exploration program
at some point

must recover at least its costs.

the program will eventually go broke.

If it does not,

(Tr. 1207-1211}

The cost

~.

of acquiring pioperty, paying the annual rent, doing seismic and

I

other work and the cost of unsuccessful drilling are all costs
which must be Tecovered for a program to remain viable.

Under

the Agreement of Settlement, the cost of future unsuccessful
development drilling efforts on producing oil and gas reservoirs will be borne exclusively by Wexpro.

It is undisputed

that in this development drilling there will be significant edge
drilling near the rim of the reservoir.

!n edge drilling, the

risk of a dry hole is substantially increased.

(Tr. 1480-81)

Mr. Roseman testified that the incentives for this risk to the
CC?mpany were "not very substantial".

(Tr 10 20)

Even where oil and gas are located, some of those wells
will be marginal where the production would not be enough to
permit the operator to recoup the cost of drilling the well,
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plus the cost of production.

Nevertheless, if the Division

and the Committee want the marginal gas delivered to MFS even
though it is more expensive, the costs of the well will be
capitalized by Wexpro/Celsius.

If they do not want the gas

and it does not measure up to the criteria set forth in the
Agreement, the excess cost has to be absorbed by Wexpro/Celsius and they get the gas.

(Agreement, §§I-19-20, II-8[d],

III-8[d])
The 5% and 8% incentive allowance on invested capital are
16/

to cover these dry hole and marginal well risks. ~.Therefore, the assertion that this allowance constitutes some sort
of hidden increase in the ''rate of return" earned by Wexpro
is a misstatement of the record.
POINT V
THE SETTLEMENT .IN NO WAY DIMISHES
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION
Contrary to the contention of Administrative Services, the
Commission does not, under the Settlement, surrender any of its
statutory powers or jurisdiction.

The Commission has not been

asked to prejudge whether Celsius or Wexpro will be regulated as
utilities because of the way they operate in the future.
It is the position of the parties under the settlement that
an oil business in Utah is not regulated as a utility.
16/

It is in-

The parties to the settlement acknowledged that the higher risks of
development well drilling must be recognized. In Section 2.2 of the
Stipulation it was agreed that "Wexpro should have sufficient legal and
economic incentive that it, in its own self interest, will prudently and
energetically exploit the properties to their full potential for the
benefit of the Company's customers and its shareholders." Administrative
Services also loses sight of the fact that th~ $40 million commitment
of Wexpro is very much at risk. (Tr. 1256)
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tended to have Wexpro become the operator of the producing
properties and to have Celsius operate as an oil company.
1528)

(Tr.

None of this has in any way foreclosed the exercise of any

jurisdictional power by the PSC.

One of the principal issues be-

fore this Court in Wexpro was the jurisdiction of the Commission
over the transfer of oil properties.
pressly recognized in the settlement.

That jurisdiction was exThe transfers to Wexpro

and Celsius were submitted to the jurisdiction of the Commission
for approval.
It is true that if the settlement is affirmed the Commission will lose jurisdiction over the transferred property.

Such

loss of jurisdiction after the transfer was intended by the
parties in order to permit the development of a vigrorous and unregulated oil and gas exploration program.
1.23, 2.2, 2.4)

(Stipulation §§ 1.21,

There should be nothing startling about such a

loss of jurisdiction.

Utility companies frequently, for a variety

of .reasons, dispose of property which had been used and useful
in the utility business.

The PSC can and does exercise its

jurisdiction to approve the sale of the property.

After the sale

is closed, however, the Commission cannot, at some future date,
assert jurisdiction over the property and undo that which has
already been done.

Such a limitation clearly recognizes and

in no way diminishes the PSC jurisdiction.
Finally, the stipulation of the Division and Cornrnittee,
that they will not assert that the activities of Wexpro or Celsius
-61-
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under the Agreement result in their being subject to public
utility regulation (Stipulation §§11.1, 11.2) takes nothing
away from the Commission's jurisdiction and power.

If the

Commission has jurisdiction, the stipulation cannot change
that fact.

The Commission itself recognized that the settle-

ment did not diminish its jurisdiction.

In the Conclusions

of Law of its December 31, 1981 Order, the PSC stated "By
adopting and approving this Stipulation, the Commission does
not relinquish or limit any jurisdiction or statutory authority it possesses".

(Order, p. 22)

This concern of Administrative Services is invalid for
two reasons.

First, it was erroneously contended in the pro-

ceedings before the Commission in this case that the stipulation
between the Divis.ion and Mountain Fuel could bind the Commission,
since the Division acted as the staff of the Commission.

Under

the present case law, however, it is clear that the Division does
not serve in a staff role to the Commission.

Utah Department of

Business Regulation, Division of Public Utilities v. Public
Service Comm'n, 614 P.2d 1242 Utah (1980).

Second, even if the

Division is the staff of the Commission or becomes the staff of
the Commission under some future statutory scheme or court
opinion, it is accepted that an agreement or stipulation of the
staff of an administrative agency is not binding on the agency.
Kixmiller v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 107 Utah 24,
151 P.2d 467 (1944).
The concerns that the settlement adversely impacts the
jurisdiction of the Commission are plainly unfounded.
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POINT VI
THE COMMISSION ORDER IS FINAL
AND BINDING ON THE PARTIES AND ON THE COMMISSION
UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA
The Shareholders have asserted that the Commission did not
go far enough in its December 31, 1981 Findings, Conclusions and
Order in confirming the finality of the distribution of the
property and the allocation of the benefits.

The facts and

applicable law necessarily lead to an opposite conclusion.
The Commission found that it had jurisdiction to review
the transfer of property between MFS and its affiliates, as
contemplated by the Agreement, and to determine whether the
transfer was in the public interest and for fair market value.
The Commission then entered its Conclusion No. 6, as follows:
The Commission's findings and conclusions with
regard to the transfer of properties and the
allocation of benefits contemplated by the
Settlement, including the findings and conclusions ~hat the transfer of properties and the
allocation of benefits are reasonable and
for market value and are in the public interest,
are intended by the Commission to be final and
not subject to future change (except through an
appropriate and timely petition for rehearing or
judicial review) . The Commission so concludes
because to ensur~ the proper development of said
properties, the parties must be able to rely on
the finality of the findings and conclusions in
regard to the transfer of properties and apportionment of benefits. The Commission also is
entitled to rely on the finality of its Order.
{Emphasis added.)
The Commission was correct in its conclusion that the Order
was final and that such finality is necessary to ensure the proper
development of the properties.
-63-
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Historically, there was a reluctance on the part of the
courts to afford res judicata effect to the decision of administrative agencies. For example, see Pearson v. Williams, 202
U.S. 281 (1906) and Warburton v. Warkentin, 345 P •. 2d 992 (Kan.
1959).

However, a dramatic change in the attitude of the courts

occurred in 1966 with the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, in
United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394
(1966).

The Court there held:
Occasionally courts have used language to the
effect that res judicata principles do not apply
to administrative proceedings, [citations omitted]
but such language is certainly too broad. When an
administrative agency is acting in a judicial
capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact
properly before it which the parties have had an
adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have
not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce
. repose. (384 U.S. at 421-2)

As a result of this decision, both federal and state courts
have widely extended the doctrine of res judicata to decisions of
administrative agencies in appropriate cases.

In Philadelphia

Electric Co. v. Borough of Lansdale, 424 A.2d 514, 521 (Pa. 1981)
the Court expressed the application of the doctrine of res
judicata to administrative proceedings as follows:
Plaintiff further argues, however, than [sic]
an administrative decision has no res judicata
effect upon a subsequent action to determine an
issue within the jurisdiction of the administrative
agency • . . . However, the application of res
judicata principles is not precluded merely
because administrative proceedings are involved
and where an administrative agency is acting in
a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues
of fact properly before it which the parties have
had an adequate opportunity to litigate the courts
will not hesitate to apply res judicata principles.
For similar holdings, see Painters Dist. Council No. 38 v.
~dgewood

Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081, 1084 (5th Cir. 1969):
-64-
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Jeffries v. Glacier State Tel. Co., 604 P.2d 4 (Alaska 1979);
Campbell v. Superior Court, 18 Ariz. App. 287, 501 P.2d 463
(1972); Cooper v. United States, 546 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1976).
The sister doctrine of collateral estoppal is also equally
applicable to administrative proceedings.
Meats, Inc.

In Superior's Brand

v. Lindley, 403 N.E.2d 996, 999 (Ohio 1980) the

Court made the following pertinent cormnents:
The doctrine of collateral estoppal is an
important. element of ·our legal system.
It provides
a necessary degree of finality to decisions rendered by our courts. Finality is a desirable objective in administrative proceedings, as well.
We recognize the need for flexibility in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to administrative decision-making process; however, because of the need for finality, we hold that
ordinarily, where an administrative proceeding is
of· a judicial nature and where the parties have had
an adequate opportunity to litigate the issues involved in the proceeding, the doctrine of collateral
estoppal may be used to bar litigation of the issues in a second administrative proceeding.
In Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), the
court was faced with whether the State of Indiana, whose state
court decisions had been silent on the subject, would extend the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to proceedings
before administrative agencies.

After outlining the history of

the development of the application of those doctrines in state
administrative proceedings, the court went on to review cases
from some 14 separate state court jurisdictions in which the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel had been applied
to administrative proceedings.
Utah unquestionably follows this modern trend.

This Court

was applying principles of res judicata to administrative
-65-
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hearings long before the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Utah
Construction, supra.

For example, in Mulcahy v. Public Service

Comm'n, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298 (1941), this Court expressly
said that the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once
judicially determined by competent authority "applies as well to
judicial and quasi-judicial acts" of administrative boards.

In

North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irr. Co., 118 Utah 602,
223 P.2d 577(1950) this Court held that an Order of the PSC
which had not been appealed from had the same effect as a judgment
and could not be collaterally attacked.
Finally, in Bowen Trucking, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n
559 P.2d· 954, 957 (Utah 1977), the Court made the following pertinent observations:
[I]f the fact situation and the legal issues are
exactly the same, I see no reason why a decision of
the Commission should ~ot be res adjudicata as to
such facts and issues, the same as in any other
legal proceeding; and there are good and sufficient
reasons why the parties should not be permitted another, and what could be indefinitely repeated
other trips on a merry-go-round of the same litigation.
The common thread running through all of these cases is that
in order for a prior decision to be given res judicata effect,
the administrative agency must be acting within its jurisdiction
and the prior proceeding must have afforded the parties a full
opportunity to be heard, including an opportunity to seek court
review from any adverse holding.

All of the required factors

are clearly present here.
The Commission's Order recites the notice that was given
and the opportunity offered for all to be heard.

The proceedings
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were conducted in a judicial format, with the witnesses being sworn
and then being examined and cross-examined on the record.

All

interested parties were afforded an opportunity to argue the matter
orally and to submit

written memoranda.

The Commission then

entered formal findings of fact and conclusions of law and a
decision.

As is evidenced by this Appeal, there is a right of

court review.
There is also a critical need for finality.

The record

clearly demonstrates that millions of dollars will be required
to do the exploratory and development drilling; that the funds
cannot be generated internally and that those asked to provide
the money through equity or debt financing will require security
of expectations.

(Tr. 1523)

The Settlement requires that Wexpro

expend not less than $40 million over the next five year period
for development gas well drilling alone.

This amount of capital

cannot be raised unless investors have assurance that the program
they invest in and the benefits they can realize, will not be
changed by some future PSC decision.
Common sense, as well as the uncontroverted testimony
dictates that people cannot be induced to invest in wildcat oil
drilling if after the "big strike" the Commission can renotice
these very same issues for hearing, set aside or modify the
Stipulation and Agreement and Order and reverse the transfer of
property and/or change the allocation of the benefits.
The fact that the Commission has continuing jurisdiction
to regulate the distribution system and to regulate MFS as a
utility, does not change the res judicata finality of this Order.
-67-
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Factual determinations are and must be final.
Wexpro are and must be final.

The transfers to

Such finality of past determination;

while the agency maintains a continuing jurisdiction is not unique
or even unusual.
Administrative agencies consistently maintain a continuing jurisdiction even though res judicata effect is given to
prior administrative decisions.

For example, the Industrial Com-

mission has jurisdiction over industrial injuries and retains continuing jurisdiction over future medical expenses, the extent of
disability and similar matters.

When an employee claims compensa-

tion and there is a hearing and the right of appeal, the decision
reached therein is final and even though the Commission exercises
jurisdiction later on over some other phase of the problem.

The

Commission never readjudicates, however, the earlier determination
that an injury was or was not compensable.
Code Ann.

See §35-1-78 Utah

(Supp. 1981) and Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n,

61 Utah 514, 215 P. 1047 (1923); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 158, 427 P.2d 952 (1967).
Likewise, the State Engineer enters orders and by sections
73-3-14 and 15, Utah Code Ann.
right of court review.

(Repl. vol. 1980) there is a

While he keeps jurisdiction for a variety

of reasons, he is not permitted to relitigate an issue which he
has already fully heard, decided and on which the appeal time has
run.

See Provo City v. Lambert, 545 P.2d 185 (Utah 1976); and

Glenwood Irr. Co. v. Meyers, 24 Utah 2d 78, 465 P.2d 1013 (1970).
-68-
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The order of the Utah PSC in the instant case clearly falls
within the scope of the foregoing rule.

The transfer of the

properties and the allocation of benefits from the consideration
given for such transfers are final and entitled to the applications of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppe~.
POINT VII
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DECLINING TO ORDER
AN ACREAGE OR MONETARY APPRAISAL
OF THE PROPERTY
The Coalition asserts at page 19 of its Brief that if any
of the utility property was to be transferred it was necessary
to express that consideration in dollars.

In Wexpro, this

Court noted that book value was not necessarily market value and
that a transfer of utility assets had to be made at market
value so that an "appropriate" benefit will redound to the credit
of customers.

Quite correctly, the Court itself made no attempt

in the Wexpro Opinion to define or set that market value or
determine how it was to be done.
The settlement Agreement does not contemplate a transfer
for a dollar consideration.

Instead, the unexplored wildcat acreage

is transferred in return for an overriding royalty interest.

As

already set out in detail at pages 27-29 of the Statement of Facts,
each of the witnesses who testified on the subject stated that
an overriding royalty on the unexplored wildcat acreage was the
standard method of fixing the value of the unexplored oil and
gas properties and that the 7% override was fair consideration
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for transfer of the specific properties subject to the settlement.

(Roseman Tr. 1026-29; Ritzma Tr. 1250-54; Cash Tr.

1502; Kirsch Tr. 1520; Hale Tr. 1331)

Ritzma further indicated

that the 2-1/2% override on the future acquired property was
"generous".

(Tr. 1252)

When asked if a dollar value appraisal was a viable alternative for fixing the value of the unexplored acreage, the
witnesses uniformly rejected such a fixed value appraisal as
"speculative" and "futile".

(Roseman Tr. 1045-46; Ritzma Tr. 1263,

1274; Hale Tr. 1333-35·, Harmon Tr. 1155)
Clearly, the correct valuation method and that agreed upon
by the adversary parties in this case is to follow the plainly
understood market and standard industry practice.

The 7% over-

riding royalty interest assures "appropriate" benefits no matter
what value the property turns out to have.

Customers receive the

benefit of any production of hydrocarbons, no matter how great
or how little.

There is no need to guess and speculate as to

the possible future value of production from undrilled acreage.
The Coalition ignores this consideration and returns to the
arguments already resolved by the earlier appeal.

It asserts,

for example that the property has a fair market value and that
the value is likely to be far in excess of depreciated book
value.

So what? There is no longer any proposal before this
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Court to transfer the property only at depreciated book
17/

value.

The value of the property is now expressed in terms

of an overriding royalty, and percentage interest, which the
uncontroverted testimony explained was the traditional method
of expressing market value in the oil and gas industry.
In short, the overwhelming weight of the evidence is to
the effect that properties are traditionally traded by buyers
and sellers in arm's-length transactions on the basis of percentage interests in the property; that on unexplored acreage, it. is
neither useful nor the practice to make estimates on the value
of the property or the reserves and, even if they are put on
the market, knowledgable oil companies ascribe widely differing
values to the property; that a dollar value could be established
by trying to sell the property on the open market for a specifie dollar amount, but it would not be in the interest of the
public, the Company or the consumer for those properties to be
sold since all would lose the continuing benefits from the
development of the properties which are secured under the
Stipulation and Agreement.
There is no error in this regard and the Commission Order
should be affirmed.
17/ The mechanics of transfer of the wildcat acreage involves the conveyance
of title or working interests in the property as well as normal accounting
entries. The value of the properties as recorded on the books of the
Company (acquisition cost or investment) is removed from rate base in
the utility accounts. The properties are then recorded on the books of
Celsius at that value. The investment of MFS in Celsius then equals the
value of the acreage. The removal of the properties from the rate base
accounts of the utility benefits customers in that investment upon which
a rate of return is calculated is reduced, thereby reducing the revenue
requirements of the utility and the rates to the customer.
-71~
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C 0 N C L U S I 0 N
The Report and Order of the Commission in this matter requires affirmance.

It brought to an end, sharply contested

and expensive litigation spanning five years of time involving
the exploration and development properties of MFS.

The impact

and uncertainty of that litigation had effectively paralyzed
MFS exploration and a further continuance of the proceedings
could have been, in the words of Roseman for the Division and
the Committee, a "disaster" regardless of who prevailed.
The record is replete with elements of risk and jeopardy
which further proceedings would have presented to the utility
gas customers, to corporate shareholders and to the essential
integrity of the MFS exploration and development program.

While

all aspects of the record below are important, the "Stipulated
Facts", "Objectives", "Consideration" and the "Agreement" at
pages 3-17 of the Stipulation are required reading to a comprehension of the issues and they are commended in particular,
to the Court.
Those who would claim that the Stipulation and Agreement
of settlement were a "soft", "sweetheart" arrangement, abuse
the English language.

The settlement and Stipulation were struck

after difficult, sometimes bitter, arms-length bargaining with
impasse reached on several occasions.

Settlement remained in

doubt even through the drafting of the Stipulation and Agreement, after an understanding in principal had been already
hammered out.
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However, the significance of the Stipulation and Agreement,
does not rest only upon achieving the settlement of complex litigation.

The Agreement reached provides far-reaching benefits to

the utility customers (in the form of low cost-of-service gas
and strengthened future gas reserves} and is in the public interest in the broadest context of that term.
The Commission had authority to adopt and did not err in
approving the Stipulation and Agreement of settlement.

The

findings are sustained by practically all of the competent
and admissible evidence, from the testimony of economists,
geologists, security analysts, petroleum engineers and accountants from both sides of the controversy.
The argument of Administrative Services and Coalition that
the 1979 Wexpro opinion of this Court constituted a judicial
mandate compelling the Commission to implement specific regulatory policy as to MFS exploration and development is fatally
flawed.

It misconceives or ignores the fundamental, appellate

function of this Court.
the Commission, alone.

Regulatory policy is the function of
The role of this Court on review is to

determine if an error in law exists or if the order is sustained
by competent evidence.

Whether all of the language in the Wex-

pro decision was central or dicta to the principal holding, notwithstanding, it cannot be gainsaid that the Stipulation and
Agreement satisfy the holding and observations made by the
majority Opinion in Wexpro in all regards.
The uncontradicted competent evidence is that the transfer
of exploration and development properties (all of which were
assumed to be in the Commission's regulatory jurisdiction} under
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the Stipulation and settlement were, at the very least, for fair
consideration and value.

In fact, there is no competent evid-

ence in the record to the contrary.
The appeal of the Shareholders is not well taken.

While

it is ackn.owledged that the Report and Order of the Commission
must have the finality of res judicata with regard to the transferred properties, the Report and Order, at page 21 paragraph 6
in particular, accomplishes finality with the effect of res
judicata.

The Commission, MFS, Wexpro, Celsius, and gas customers

are assured under the Report and Order as well as the controlling
case law, that the properties subject to the Stipulation and Agreement may not be attacked or questioned in the future.
The Report and Order concluding this massive controversy and
approving the Stipulation and Agreement of settlement should be
affirmed.
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